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The Promise and Pitfalls of Using
Imprecise School Accountability
Measures
Thomas J. Kane and Douglas O. Staiger

O

ver the last decade, states have constructed elaborate incentive systems
for schools using school-level test scores. By the spring of 2002, nearly
every state and the District of Columbia had implemented some form of
accountability for public schools using test scores. For instance, the state of California spent nearly $700 million on financial incentives in 2001, with bonuses of up
to $25,000 for teachers in schools with the largest test score improvements. The
federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 mandates even broader accountability,
requiring all states to test children in grades three through eight within three years
and to intervene in schools failing to achieve specific performance targets.
Economists have paid scant attention to the properties of school accountability
systems.1 The nature of the incentives presented to schools ultimately depends
upon the strengths and weaknesses of the school-level mean test score measures
upon which most accountability systems are based. Accordingly, in this article, we
describe the statistical properties of school test score measures, which are less
reliable than is commonly recognized, and explore the implications for school
incentives. Many accountability systems that appear reasonable at first glance
perform in perverse ways when test score measures are imprecise.

1
One early exception was a paper by Clotfelter and Ladd (1996), which evaluated the impact of
accountability systems in Dallas and South Carolina.

y Thomas J. Kane is Professor of Policy Studies and Economics, University of California at
Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California. Douglas O. Staiger is Associate Professor of Economics,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. Kane is a Faculty Research Fellow and Staiger
is a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their e-mail addresses are 具tomkane@ucla.edu典 and 具doug.staiger@dartmouth.edu典.
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Elements of a School Accountability System
School accountability systems typically include three elements: testing students, public reporting of school performance and rewards or sanctions based on
some measure of school performance or improvement.2 As seen in Figure 1, by the
2001–2002 school year, nearly all states issued report cards on their schools. It was
less common for states to include explicit financial rewards (18 states) or sanctions
(20 states).3 However, the 27 states that provided either rewards or sanctions in
2001–2002 included nine of the ten largest states and contained 75 percent of the
U.S. population. We briefly describe some of the common design elements currently being used by states in each of these three areas.
Student Testing
Although some states use “off-the-shelf” tests such as the Stanford Achievement
Test or Iowa Test of Basic Skills in their testing programs, many states have
developed their own tests. Nearly every state and the District of Columbia currently
administer some type of English and math test for at least one grade level in
elementary schools, in middle schools and in high schools (testing, for instance, in
grades 4, 8 and 10). Only one-third of the states currently administer such tests in
grades 3– 8, as mandated by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. In addition,
roughly two-thirds of the states administer tests in other subject areas—primarily
science, history or social studies—in at least one grade.
States differ in their requirements determining which students must take the
test. For example, students with learning disabilities, limited English proficiency or
who are absent on the day of the test are often exempted from taking the test. Such
rules give school personnel considerable opportunity to manipulate which students
take the test and thus affect average performance. Many states have attempted to
limit such behavior by penalizing schools with a low proportion of students taking
the test. In Massachusetts and Colorado, for example, absent students are counted
as failing the test, while in Florida and Michigan, any school with a large proportion
of students not taking the test is ineligible for the state’s highest rankings. The new
federal No Child Left Behind Act imposes limits on the proportion of students that
can be exempted from testing.

2
The information on school accountability systems presented in this section is derived from Education
Week’s Quality Counts reports from various years, in combination with our own compilation of information from state websites.
3
School performance differences are at least partially capitalized in local housing values, so the
publication of school test scores may also have an impact on teacher incentives through parental
pressure—albeit incompletely, since each parent would be tempted to free ride on other parents’
efforts. For example, Black (1999) evaluated the effect of school test scores on housing values, using
differences in housing values near boundaries of school assignment zones. Her results suggest that a one
student-level standard deviation in school test scores is associated with a $1,941 difference in housing
value.
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Figure 1
Trends in State Accountability Systems

Source: Education Week (2002).

Public Reporting
Most states provide the public with a report card on each school, containing information on student test score performance.4 In 30 states, this information is used to form an overall performance index for each school, often in the
form of a letter grade (A–F) or equivalent ranking. Half of these states rely
solely on student test scores to construct the rankings, while the remainder use
student test scores combined with other information, such as attendance and
dropout rates. In addition to being publicly reported, these rankings often serve
as the basis for determining which schools are eligible for rewards and sanctions.
Although states differ in how they use test scores to gauge school performance,
all states use some combination of three measures. The most commonly used
measure is average test score levels among students in a given grade. Test score
levels are often reported in terms of the percentage of students at a school scoring
in various ranges, such as the proportion failing, proficient or advanced. Second,
many of the largest states—including California, Florida and New York—rely in
part on changes in average test scores in a given school between one year and the
next. California, for example, ranks schools according to whether they have exceeded an annual growth target, which is somewhat higher for schools with poor
baseline performance. The third approach, used by a handful of states including
Arizona, North Carolina and Tennessee, rates schools using the average gain in test
performance between the end of one grade and the end of the next grade. Thus,

4

Much of the data on school-level test scores used in this paper can be downloaded from the California
Department of Education (具http://www.cde.ca.gov/psaa/api/典), the Texas Education Agency (具http://
www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/典) and from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (具http://www.ncpublicschools.org/abcs/典). To calculate student-level gain scores, we obtained
student-level data from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction.
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where the change approach would measure the performance of this year’s fourth
grade students relative to last year’s fourth grade students, the gain approach would
measure the performance of this year’s fourth-grade students relative to their own
performance in third grade. The latter methodology requires states to invest in data
systems enabling them to link the scores of individual students across years. Test
score changes and gains, which focus on improvement in performance, are generally seen as less biased methods of comparing schools serving different student
populations (however, as we will argue below, improvement and value-added are
also much more difficult to measure reliably).
Finally, to encourage schools to raise the performance of all youth, 17 states
report separate measures of the performance for specified subgroups, including
minority, low-income and limited-English-proficient students. The accountability
system in eleven states, including Texas and California, explicitly penalize schools
with poor subgroup performance.
Sanctions and Rewards
The majority of state accountability systems now use some combination of
explicit sanctions for low-performing schools and monetary rewards for highperforming schools. Sanctions are used sparingly, with fewer than 5 percent of
schools typically eligible for some form of sanction in a given year. Typically, the
lowest-performing schools in any single year are required to submit an improvement plan and are eligible for various forms of assistance from the state. Schools
that continue to be low performing over multiple years are subject to increasingly
stringent sanctions, such as permitting their students to transfer to other schools
(eleven states) and eventual closure or reconstitution (17 states). However, such
sanctions have been rarely used, even in states with long-standing accountability
systems, such as Texas. The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 will require
much tougher sanctions in the coming years, including providing vouchers to
parents for out-of-school programs and eventually replacing school staff or converting failing schools to charter schools.
Financial awards are typically made to a school for schoolwide use, although a
handful of states including California, North Carolina and Pennsylvania allow for
bonuses to teachers. The magnitude of the financial awards varies. For example,
award-winning schools in Texas received less than $5,000 per school, while the average
award in California was over $50,000 per school in 2001. Financial incentives are often
spread across a large number of schools with performance thresholds near the state
average, but sometimes large rewards are targeted on a few schools with exceptional
performance. For instance, in California, roughly half of all schools received an award
in 2001, but the teachers in less than 1 percent of schools with the largest test score
increases received awards of $5,000 to $25,000 per teacher.

Signal and Noise in School-Level Test Scores
In the rush to implement accountability systems, little attention has been paid
to the imprecision of the test score measures on which they are based. Yet, two
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well-known facts suggest that school performance is difficult to measure with one
year’s worth of test data. First, we have known at least since the analysis by Coleman
et al. (1966) that the between-school variance in student test scores represents only
10 to 15 percent of the variance in student test scores. In other words, the
difference in mean test performance between the best- and worst-performing
schools is not nearly as large as the difference in performance between the best and
worst student in the typical school. Second, the median elementary school in the
United States has only 69 students per grade level.5 With a sample that small, even
a few particularly talented or rambunctious youth can have a large impact on the
grade-level score for a school from year to year. When volatility in test scores is
combined with a relatively narrow distribution of school performance, it implies
that the 95 percent confidence interval for the average fourth-grade reading or
math score in a school with 69 students per grade level would extend from roughly
the 25th to the 75th percentile among schools of that size (Kane and Staiger,
2002b).
The importance of sampling variation in school-level mean test scores is
apparent in Figure 2, which plots various measures of fourth-grade math performance against the number of fourth-grade students taking the test for 1163
elementary schools in North Carolina in 1998. These plots illustrate two facts that
are important in the discussion of volatility. First, there is high variability in test
scores among small schools. The upper left-hand panel shows the mean level of
math performance in fourth grade; the lower left-hand panel reports the mean gain
in math performance of individual students tracked from the end of third grade to
the end of fourth grade. For both test score levels and gains, virtually all of the
schools with the highest and lowest scores were small schools. Second, this variability in test scores among small schools is not solely due to heterogeneity among small
schools. The right-hand panels of Figure 2 report the one-year change in each
school’s mean test score and mean gain score between 1998 and 1999. The small
schools are also much more likely to report large changes in mean scores and mean
gains from one year to the next.
There are many potential sources of short-term fluctuations in student performance. Sampling variation is surely one factor. But there are also likely to be other
sources of variation at the classroom level, generated by classroom chemistry between
a teacher and class or the presence of particularly disruptive students in a class. Indeed,
certain sources of variation might generate temporary fluctuations in test performance
for a whole school, such as a dog barking in the parking lot, inclement weather on the
day of the test or school-level curricular differences interacting with different test forms.
One way of testing for the importance of sampling variation and other one-time
shocks to performance is to determine whether improvements (or declines) in a
school’s test score performance tend to be reversed in the following year. If a change
in test scores is due to a one-time phenomenon, then the school is likely to revert back
to its prior performance level in the next year. In the extreme, if school test scores were
5
In the 1999 Common Core of Data, among schools with a fourth-grade classroom, the median school
contained 69 students in the fourth-grade, and the mean number of students was 74.
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Figure 2
Mean Fourth-Grade Math Scores and Value Added by School Size

pure noise and independent from one year to the next, we would expect a correlation
between the change this year and the change next year to be ⫺0.5.6 On the other hand,
when test score changes reflect permanent improvements, they serve as the basis for
subsequent improvements or declines, and we would not expect such mean reversion.
Indeed, we would expect a correlation of 0 in the change from one year to the next.
If some changes are permanent and some changes are purely transitory, one would
expect a negative correlation between 0 and ⫺0.5 (Kane and Staiger, 2002b).
Using data from North Carolina, we estimate that changes in fourth-grade
math scores have a correlation of ⫺0.37 with changes in the next year. This
estimate suggests that 74 percent of the variance in the change in math scores is
transitory (⫺0.37 is 74 percent of ⫺0.5).7 Similarly, changes in fourth-grade math
gains have a correlation of ⫺0.45 with changes in the next year, suggesting that
If test scores (yt) are identically and independently distributed, then corr(yt – yt–1 ,yt – 1 – yt – 2) ⫽ cov(yt
yt – 1 ,yt – 1 – yt – 2)/var(yt – yt – 1) ⫽ ⫺ y2/(2y2) ⫽ ⫺0.5.
Formally, suppose that test scores (yt) are the sum of a fixed component (␣), a persistent component
(vt), which follows a random walk (vt ⫽ vt – 1 ⫹ ut), and an independent and identically distributed
transitory component (t). Then it is straightforward to show that (1) Var(⌬yt) ⫽ u2 ⫹ 22, and
(2) ⫺2corr(⌬yt,⌬yt – 1) ⫽ 22/(u2 ⫹ 22). Thus, ⫺2 times the correlation provides an estimate of how
much of the total variation in test score changes is accounted for by the transitory component. This
model implies that changes more than one year apart are uncorrelated. In the North Carolina data, we
estimate these correlations to be below 0.05 in absolute value. Note that we can also derive an estimate
of how much of test scores (not changes) is accounted for by the transitory component, using 2 ⫽
⫺corr(⌬yt,⌬yt – 1)*Var(⌬yt). We use a slightly different approach in the results reported below in Figure 4,
but the estimates using either method are similar.
6

–
7
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Figure 3
Correlation in School Test Scores, Fourth-Grade Math Levels and Gains

90 percent of the variance in the change in this measure is transitory. Estimates
suggest even less persistence in reading scores (Kane and Staiger, 2001). In other
words, if one were to look for signs of improvement by closely tracking changes in
school-level scores from one year to the next, most of what one observed would be
temporary— either due to sampling variation or some other nonpersistent cause.
But the variation in school-level test score measures is not entirely transitory.
Figure 3 plots the correlation of school test scores one to five years apart, using
fourth-grade math scores (levels and gains) from North Carolina between 1994 and
1999. The correlation in school performance measures one year apart is 0.77 for
math levels and 0.41 for math gains. The correlation falls off gradually as one looks
at school test scores more than one year apart, declining by about 10 percent per
additional year for test score levels and by about 20 percent per additional year for
gains. In other words, schools with high test scores in a given year tend to have high
test scores in future years, but the correlation drops dramatically with a one-year lag
and then fades out gradually over time.
Figure 3 has a simple interpretation. Suppose that observed test scores are composed of two parts. One part represents persistent factors influencing test scores, such
as the quality of teachers at the school or the curriculum being used, which are highly
correlated from year to year. As time passes, these persistent factors influencing test
scores may gradually evolve, due to such factors as teacher turnover or the adoption of
new curriculum, causing a steady decline in the correlation as one looks at school test
scores further apart in time. A second part of observed test scores represents purely
nonpersistent factors influencing test scores, such as sampling variation or a particularly disruptive student in a class, which are equally uncorrelated at a one-year or a
five-year lag. These nonpersistent factors, even if they have real effects on student
learning (as is the case with a disruptive student), are the types of things that schools
have little control over and cannot replicate on a consistent basis. Thus, the low
correlation between scores one year apart reflects the presence of nonpersistent
factors, while the more gradual decline in correlation in school test scores more than
one year apart reflects the slow change in persistent factors.
This interpretation of the data suggests a way of decomposing the variance in
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test scores into persistent and nonpersistent components. The gradual decline seen
in Figure 3 beyond the first year implies that the correlation in the persistent
component declines by about 10 percent per year for test score levels and by about
20 percent per year for test score gains. In fact, this annual decline in the
correlation of the persistent component is broadly consistent with the annual
teacher turnover hazard of between 10 and 15 percent in North Carolina (Kane
and Staiger, 2001). Assuming that the annual decline in the correlation is constant,
this would imply that school test scores one year apart should be correlated 0.9 in
levels and 0.8 in gains. Any additional decline in the correlation at the first year is
the result of the nonpersistent component of test scores. This logic suggests that
about 13 percent of the variation in test score levels is nonpersistent (the difference
between the 0.9 correlation expected from the persistent component and the 0.77
correlation in observed test scores), while about 39 percent of the variation in test
score gains is nonpersistent (the difference between the 0.8 correlation expected
and the 0.41 correlation observed).
Figure 4 uses this approach to decompose the variation in school test scores
into persistent and nonpersistent sources. In addition, we estimate the proportion
of the nonpersistent variance in school test scores that is the result of sampling
variation alone. It is straightforward to calculate the contribution of sampling
variation: each school’s test score is a sample average over n students, so has a
sampling variance of 2/n, where 2 is the within-school variance in the test score.8
We do the calculation for three commonly used measures of performance: test
score levels, test score gains and changes in test score levels. To illustrate the
increased importance of noise in measures for small schools, we do the calculation
separately for the smallest, middle and largest quintile of schools (based on average
number of students taking the test between 1994 and 1999).
Several results are worth highlighting in Figure 4. First, much of the difference
in the test score levels is persistent. Even among the smallest quintile of schools,
nonpersistent factors account for only 27 percent of the variance between schools.
Among the largest quintile of schools, such factors account for only 13 percent of
the variance. However, since we are not adjusting for initial performance levels or
for the demographic characteristics of the students, much of that reliability may be
due to the unchanging characteristics of the populations feeding those schools and
not necessarily due to persistent educational practices in the schools.
8
We estimate the three components as follows, with the calculation done separately for each school size
quintile. Let 2y be the total variance across schools in the test score measure. Sampling variance for
each school was calculated by dividing the average within-school variance by the school’s sample size.
The total variance due to sampling variance (2samp) is the sample average of this across schools. The
variance due to persistent factors was calculated as 2pers ⫽ (2y)(1/pers), where 1 is the correlation of
the test measure with a one-year lag, and pers is an estimate of the first order serial correlation in the
persistent component. We estimate pers with the average of (k ⫹ 1/k), for k ⫽ 1 to 4, that is with the
average proportional decline in correlation between lags 1 and 5. The variance of the other nonpersistent component was estimated as the residual (2y – 2pers – 2samp). For changes in test score levels,
sampling variance and other nonpersistent variance were estimated by doubling the corresponding
estimates from the levels, and the persistent variance was estimated as the residual. See Kane and Staiger
(2001) for a more efficient estimator and standard errors.
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Figure 4
Sources of Variance in Fourth-Grade Test Scores by School Size Quintile

Second, gain scores and changes in average level of performance are measured
unreliably. More than half (56 percent) of the variance among the smallest quintile
of schools in mean gain scores is due to sampling variation and other nonpersistent
factors. Even among the largest quintile of schools, nonpersistent factors are
estimated to account for 34 percent of the variance in gain scores. Changes in mean
test scores from one year to the next are measured even more unreliably. More
than 80 percent of the variance in the annual change in mean test scores among the
smallest quintile of schools is due to one-time, nonpersistent factors.
Third, the reliability of using changes in average level of performance cannot
be much improved by combining information from more than one grade. For
instance, even though the largest quintile of schools were roughly four times as
large as the smallest quintile, the proportion of the variance in annual changes due
to nonpersistent factors was still over 60 percent.
Overall, these results suggest that annual test scores are quite unreliable
measures of performance differences across schools and over time, particularly in
smaller schools. An alternative approach that reduces the impact of year-to-year
variation is to pool test score data for individual schools over time. The No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 provides states with the option of calculating three-year
weighted averages of school performance on test scores. In Kane and Staiger
(2001), we show that the optimal weights for averaging performance over time
(which maximize the reliability of the resulting performance measure) incorporate
information on the signal variance, sampling variation and the degree of persistence in the signal over time: One places more weight on past performance when
a single year’s test score is unreliable and when the persistent component of
performance is strongly correlated over time. The resulting estimate is a sophisticated
moving average of each school’s prior test scores, and it is equivalent to a Bayesian
estimate of the posterior mean of the persistent component of each school’s test
score if the underlying distributions are normal. Our work suggests that this
approach can greatly improve the accuracy of school ratings. For example, we
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found that the optimally weighted average of past test scores was much more
successful in picking schools that were likely to perform well one or two years in the
future, more than doubling the R-squared of the forecast compared to using a
single year of data. But in most cases, simple averages of past test scores achieved
more than half of this gain in forecast performance. Thus, even simple averaging
over several years leads to markedly improved performance measures.

Three Cautionary Tales
How much should we be concerned about the imprecision of the test score
measures being used in school accountability systems? After all, no performance
measure is perfect. Even noisy performance measures may provide useful information that can be incorporated into a carefully designed incentive contract. The
problem resides not with the measures themselves, but with the way that these
measures are often used. In this section, we provide three cautionary tales of
common practices that appear to be reasonable, yet perform in perverse ways
because test score measures are unreliable.
Focusing on Schools with the Very Best and Worst Test Scores
Many state accountability systems focus on outliers, targeting the highest- and
lowest-performing schools for rewards or sanctions. Yet in light of the properties
described above, such apparently reasonable schemes will primarily affect small
schools and will leave large schools largely unaffected.
For example, North Carolina has programs that target schools at both ends of
the distribution. At one extreme, they have provided special recognition each year
since 1997 to the 25 schools in the state with the largest mean “growth composite
index,” essentially a measure of the mean gain in performance for a school’s
students since the previous spring. Teachers in these schools are given a banner to
celebrate their status and a banquet is held in their honor. At the other extreme,
the state assigned assistance teams to intervene in schools with the poorest performance on state tests. Table 1 displays the proportion of elementary schools that
were either in the “top 25” or assigned an assistance team between 1997 and 2000,
in total and separately by school size deciles. Small schools were much more likely
to receive awards and more likely to receive sanctions. More than a quarter
(27.7 percent) of the smallest decile of elementary schools were among the top 25
schools at some point over the four years the awards have been given. In fact, the
smallest schools were 23 times more likely to win a “Top 25” award than the largest
schools! Similarly, all but one of the elementary schools assigned an assistance team
were in the bottom four deciles by school size. The smallest decile of schools would
have received an even larger share of the assistance teams, except for a rule
requiring that the proportion of students scoring below grade level to be statistically
significantly below 50 percent.
Small schools are overrepresented in these two programs largely because test
score gains are much noisier in small schools. Table 1 also presents information on
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Table 1
Awards and Sanctions Among Elementary Schools in North Carolina

School Size
Smallest decile
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Largest decile
Total

Percentage Ever
“Top 25”
1997–2000

Percentage Ever
Assigned
Assist. Team
1997–2000

Mean Gain
in Math

Between-School
Variance in
Mean Gain in
Math

27.7%
11.8
8.2
3.6
2.4
3.6
4.8
7.1
0
1.2

1.2%
4.7
7.1
1.2
0
0
0
0
1.2
0

.020
⫺.007
.008
.009
⫺.002
.019
.007
.006
⫺.007
⫺.011

.048
.030
.028
.026
.024
.018
.016
.016
.015
.011

.004

.023

7.0

1.5

Note: The above refers to the 840 regular public elementary schools for whom we had data from 1994
through 2000. Charter schools are not included.

the mean gain scores in math for fourth and fifth grade and the between-school
variance in school mean gain scores by size decile. There is no significant difference
in average performance across the deciles, but the variance in mean gain scores
among schools in the smallest size decile was more than four times the variance
among the largest decile of schools. Thus, by simply splitting themselves into
smaller units, large schools could increase their chances of being among the top
25— but would also increase the risk of being assigned an assistance team. Without
additional noise in their test score measures, large schools have very little chance of
ever appearing in the extremes of the distribution.
This pattern of test scores by school size poses some challenges for designing
a system of rewards and sanctions. If the state requires schools to exceed a high
threshold in order to receive a reward, there will be a much higher chance that the
small school will win the award than a large school— even if the small and large
schools have the same “true” performance level. Indeed, large schools are likely to
be unmotivated by school accountability programs that emphasize the extremes,
since they have very little chance of ever appearing in the tails of the distribution.
While they may not be fully cognizant of the statistical issues involved, those
working at schools of varying sizes would be expected to learn over time that their
efforts have a greater or lesser impact on their likelihood of winning.
One possible remedy for this problem would be to establish different thresholds for schools of different sizes. For example, grouping schools according to size
(as is often done in high school sports) and giving awards to the top 5 percent in
each size class would tend to even out the incentives (and disparities) between large

102

Journal of Economic Perspectives

and small schools.9 Another alternative would be to establish thresholds closer to
the middle of the test score distribution, where both large and small schools have
a chance to win so that the difference in incentives is less extreme. This is what
many states in fact do— give smaller rewards to a larger group of schools. In North
Carolina, for example, the focus was not solely on the outlier schools. Roughly
two-thirds of the schools in 1999 were identified as having achieved “exemplary”
growth, and these schools received the lion’s share of the award money.
Drawing Inferences Based on One-Year Changes
Volatility in test scores can wreak havoc if policymakers draw inferences from
short-term fluctuations. For example, when test scores were released in Massachusetts in November 1999, Provincetown showed the greatest improvement over the
previous year. The Boston Globe published an extensive story describing the various
ways in which Provincetown had changed educational strategies, and only in the
detailed table of school results did one learn that only 22 students took the test in
1999 (Tarcy, 1999). Such dramatic swings in test scores are not uncommon for a
small school and are very unreliable indicators of improving performance. Yet,
there is a large literature in psychology that suggests that people are often overconfident in predicting future performance on the basis of current performance
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1971; Plous, 1993). That same overconfidence may lead
local school administrators to draw unwarranted conclusions on the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of policies based upon such short-term fluctuations in performance.
Similarly, some accountability systems require schools to improve their student’s performance continuously. For example, the initial versions of the No Child
Left Behind Act passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate in 2001
included provisions that required schools to show improvement in math and
reading scores each year or be subject to a variety of sanctions. But even when a
school is on the right track, the path to improved student performance is rarely a
straight path. The natural fluctuation in noisy test score measures means that two
steps forward are often followed by one step back. The No Child Left Behind Act
was rewritten in conference committee after an initial analysis suggested that
virtually every school in the country would have failed to improve at least once in
a five-year period because of the natural volatility in test score measures (Kane,
Staiger and Geppert, 2002; Broder, 2001).
For example, in North Carolina between 1994 and 1999, the proportion of
students in grades three through five scoring at the “proficient” level or higher in
mathematics rose from 55 percent to 70 percent—roughly 3 percentage points per
year. The proportion of third- through fifth-grade students scoring at the proficient
level in reading grew from 61 to 70 percent, or nearly 2 percentage points per year.
Progress of that magnitude has made North Carolina the envy of many other states.
Nevertheless, only 11 percent of North Carolina schools witnessed an increase in
9

Indeed, the underlying reasons for separate sports leagues for high schools of different size may also
be statistics of sampling distributions. A high school with 3000 students is much more likely to find five
students over 6⬘ 5⬙ in height to form a basketball team than a school with 300 students.
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math proficiency for five straight years, only 6 percent witnessed an increase in
reading proficiency for five straight years and fewer than 2 percent of schools
witnessed an increase in both subjects for five straight years. Thus, under the initial
standard proposed in the No Child Left Behind Act, over 98 percent of North
Carolina elementary schools would have “failed” and been subject to sanctions!
When looking for signs of improvement at the school level, the clear lesson is
that one must look to trends over several years rather than the change in any single
year.
Racial and Ethnic Subgroup Rules
Despite some closing of the gap in academic performance between whites and
blacks between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, the gaps in standardized test
scores by race and ethnicity remain quite large (Jencks and Phillips, 1998). Among
non-Hispanic youth, the gap in mean test scores between whites and blacks is often
between three-quarters and one standard deviation. The gap between non-Hispanic
white and Latino youth is slightly smaller. Because of concerns about these gaps in
test performance, many accountability systems (including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001) require schools to achieve minimum standards not just for
the school as a whole, but for each racial and ethnic subgroup within the school as
well. The goal is worthwhile, but the design of accountability rules may well be
counterproductive—targeting fewer resources to diverse schools simply because of
their diversity and providing strong incentives to schools to segregate by race or
ethnicity.
The California system provides an interesting example. To win a “Governor’s Performance Award” in California, a school must achieve a minimum
improvement in performance at the school level, but also for each “numerically
significant” racial or ethnic subgroup within the school. To be numerically
significant, a group must represent at least 15 percent of the student body and
contain more than 30 students or represent more than 100 students regardless
of their percentage. There are eight different groups that could qualify as
“numerically significant,” depending upon the number of students in each
group in a school: African American, American Indian (or Alaska Native),
Asian, Filipino, Hispanic, Pacific Islander, White non-Hispanic or “socioeconomically disadvantaged” students (defined as a student of any race neither of
whose parents completed a high school degree or who participates in the
school’s free or reduced price lunch program).
Of course, measured changes in test scores for small subgroups are often quite
volatile. Moreover, to the extent the higher variance is due to sampling variation,
their fluctuation is likely to be nearly independent. As a result, California’s rules are
analogous to a system that makes every school flip a coin once for each minority
subgroup and then gives awards only to schools that get “heads” on every flip.
Schools with more minority subgroups must flip the coin more times and, therefore, are put at a purely statistical disadvantage relative to racially homogeneous
schools. Moreover, because improvement at most schools exceeded their target, the
additional volatility of scores for small-sized subgroups—and small schools in
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general—further increased the chances of falling below the target (unlike the case
of the “Top 25” award program in North Carolina where volatility helped small
schools to achieve a high target).
This statistical disadvantage is clearly seen in Table 2, which reports the
proportion of California elementary school’s winning their Governor’s Performance Award by school size quintile and number of numerically significant subgroups in each school. Among the smallest quintile of elementary schools, racially
heterogeneous schools were almost half as likely to win a Governor’s Performance
award as racially homogeneous schools. This is particularly ironic given that the
more integrated schools had slightly larger overall growth in performance between
1999 and 2000 (36.0 points versus 33.4 points). The statistical bias against racially
heterogeneous schools is also apparent among larger schools, but somewhat less
pronounced because subgroups in these schools are larger in size, and, as a result,
their scores are less volatile.10
Table 2 has several important implications. First, under rules that focus on
performance by subgroups, a district would have a strong incentive to segregate by
race/ethnicity. Consider a district with four small schools, each being evenly divided
among African-American, Latino, Asian-American and white non-Hispanic. According
to the results in Table 2, the district could nearly double each school’s chance of
winning an award by segregating each group and creating four racially homogeneous
schools. Second, because minority youth are more likely to attend heterogeneous
schools than white non-Hispanic youth, the average school attended by minority youth
actually receives less award money as a result of the minority subgroup rule. For
example, the average African-American student attended a school with 2.8 subgroups,
compared with 2.2 subgroups in the schools attended by the average white nonHispanic student. As a result, African-Americans in California were nearly 5 percent less
likely to be in an award-winning school solely because of the statistical bias against
schools with subgroups (Kane and Staiger, 2002c). A similar calculation suggests that
Latinos were 2.5 percent less likely to be in an award winning school because of
the subgroup bias.

Other Limitations of School Test Score Measures
School test score measures are imperfect measures of schools’ output for at
least three other reasons.
First, test score measures may reflect factors outside of a school’s control, such
as family background, that grant schools in wealthier districts an advantage, particularly when schools are rated on the basis of their level of performance. One

10

Kane and Staiger (2002c) present additional evidence suggesting that racial subgroup rules have had
little impact on the performance of minority students in Texas. The improvement in performance for
minority students in schools where they were sufficiently numerous to count as a separate subgroup was
similar to the improvement for minority students in schools where there were not sufficient numbers of
such students to qualify for separate subgroup status.
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Table 2
Proportion of California Elementary Schools Winning Governor’s Performance
Awards by School Size and Number of Numerically Significant Subgroups
Proportion Winning
(Average Growth in Academic Performance Index 1999 –2000)
[# of Schools in Category]
# of Numerically Significant Subgroups
1

2

3

4⫹

Total:

Smallest

.824
(33.4)
[204]

.729
(45.6)
[343]

.587
(42.2)
[349]

.471
(36.0)
[51]

.683
(41.2)
[947]

2nd

.886
(29.9)
[158]

.769
(42.6)
[337]

.690
(42.2)
[358]

.670
(43.9)
[94]

.749
(40.5)
[947]

3rd

.853
(26.8)
[156]

.795
(36.3)
[308]

.708
(38.9)
[390]

.667
(44.6)
[93]

.756
(36.6)
[947]

4th

.903
(28.0)
[144]

.823
(41.8)
[328]

.776
(39.5)
[379]

.656
(40.8)
[96]

.799
(38.7)
[947]

Largest

.876
(29.5)
[89]

.776
(37.9)
[370]

.726
(36.9)
[387]

.686
(40.5)
[102]

.755
(37.0)
[948]

Total:

.864
(29.8)
[751]

.778
(40.9)
[1686]

.699
(39.9)
[1863]

.647
(41.7)
[436]

.749
(38.8)
[4736]

Note: Reflecting the rules of the Governor’s Performance Award program, the above was limited to
elementary schools with more than 100 students. A school’s Academic Performance Index (API) was a
weighted average of the proportion of students in each quintile of the national distribution on the
reading, math, language and spelling sections of the Stanford 9 test.

partial solution to this problem is to focus on so-called “value-added” measures of
achievement, such as the gain scores we have analyzed above. However, such a
solution is only partial, since students differ not only in their baseline performance,
but also in their subsequent trajectory. For instance, in our analysis of the North
Carolina data, students with more educated parents not only had higher baseline
scores, but they also gained more from year to year.
Test score improvements and value-added measures may be less biased methods of rating school performance than test score levels. But the reduction in bias
comes at the cost of greater unreliability. Relative to test score levels, gains and
changes in test scores are attempting to identify much smaller differences across
schools with measures that are at least as noisy. Test score measures are being used
for two purposes—to provide incentives and to identify best practice. Although the
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incentive problems created by greater imprecision can be accommodated by attaching less weight to the noisy measures, the search for best practice requires less
noisy measures. As a result, when using value-added measures or changes in scores
over time, it is particularly important to implement some method for pooling data
over time.
A second problem with test score measures is that they are incomplete measures of school output. Most test-based accountability systems are based upon
reading and math scores alone.11 Other academic subjects (such as science) and
dimensions of learning that contribute to the public good (such as civics) are
typically assigned zero value. Similarly, standardized tests are often designed to
determine basic proficiency and may assign little value to advanced knowledge of
a subject. Rewarding schools for tested subjects will implicitly punish schools that
excel in other valued, but difficult-to-measure domains and distort instruction
toward the subset of subject areas and concepts that are tested. For example, in the
Kentucky accountability system in the early 1990s, science was tested in fourth
grade and math was tested in fifth grade. Stecher and Barron (1999) found that
teachers had reallocated their time so that they spent much more time on science
in fourth grade when students took the science test and on math in fifth grade
when students took the math test. Jacob (2001) found that scores on science and
social studies leveled off or declined in Chicago after the introduction of an
accountability system focused on math and reading performance.
A third source of error in test score measures is occasionally introduced by the
test publishers themselves. The most egregious errors (such as mistaken scoring
sheets or test booklets with missing pages) are usually discovered. But more subtle
errors are introduced when companies attempt to “equate” tests from year to year,
when new test items are introduced. Such errors can be difficult to find, as New
York City learned in 1999, when 9000 students were mistakenly sent to summer
school and the superintendent resigned on the basis of test scores that were
subsequently revised upward by the test publisher due to an equating error (Steinberg and Henriques, 2001a, b).12

The Impacts of Accountability Systems on Student Achievement
Although there is some evidence that school-level and teacher-level incentives
were associated with improved student test performance in Israel (Lavy 2002a, b),
the evidence on the impact of accountability systems on student achievement in the
United States has been limited and ambiguous. The experience in North Carolina
and Texas—two states with high visibility accountability systems— has been cited as
evidence of the value of accountability systems. Figure 5 portrays the improvement

11

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 requires states to test reading and math skills in all grades 3– 8
by the 2005–2006 school year. Science tests would not be added until 2007–2008, and there are no plans
to require states to test other skills.
12
For more examples of test publisher errors, see Sandham (2001), Keller (2002) and Manzo (2001).
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Figure 5
Changes in NAEP Math Scores by State and Grade, 1992–2000

in state math scores for public school students on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) in fourth grade and eighth grade between 1992 and
2000. At the national level, fourth-grade math scores rose by slightly under a
quarter of a standard deviation over the decade, and eighth-grade math scores grew
by one-fifth of a student-level standard deviation. However, mean math scores in
fourth grade and eighth grade grew by 0.6 standard deviations in North Carolina
and by roughly 0.5 and 0.3 standard deviations in fourth and eighth grades,
respectively, in Texas. To appreciate the magnitude of this increase, remember that
the gap in test scores between blacks and non-Hispanic whites is typically between
three-quarters and one standard deviation.
Some analysts have drawn a connection between the test score increases in the
states of North Carolina and Texas and those states’ emphasis on school accountability (Grissmer and Flanagan, 1998). However, there are three reasons to be
cautious in drawing such an inference.
First, North Carolina and Texas were not the only states pursuing aggressive
school accountability policies during the 1990s. Indeed, by the late 1990s, only a
handful of states were not doing so. For instance, Kentucky was an early innovator
in the move toward school-level accountability, and their improvement on the
NAEP during the 1990s was close to the national average. Ohio achieved impressive
gains in both fourth- and eighth-grade math, yet it has no policy of attaching
financial incentives to school test scores. The successes in North Carolina and Texas
may well be because of their accountability policies, but the success may have been
due to other policy differences as well.
Second, at least part of the increase in North Carolina and Texas may have
been due to an increase in the proportion of sampled youth excluded from the
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NAEP sample. The NAEP test has traditionally excluded the test scores of students
who are granted testing accommodations, such as extra time to take the test. Most
states granted accommodations to a larger share of students following the passage
of the Individuals with Disabilities Act in 1996.13 Between 1992 and 2000, the
average state increased its exclusions by 3.5 percentage points (from 5 percent of
sampled youth to 8.5 percent of sampled youth), while Texas and North Carolina
increased their exclusion rates by 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively. In fact,
the increase in exclusion rates in North Carolina was larger than in any other state.
However, it is unlikely that the change in exclusion rates accounts for all of the
rise in test scores. To provide an upper bound of the effect of the exclusion rates,
suppose that all excluded students would have scored in the bottom tail of the
distribution— clearly an extreme assumption. North Carolina excluded 13 percent
of students from the distribution in 2000. If the distribution of test scores is normal
at the student level, then truncating scores at the 13th percentile would have raised
test scores by 0.25 standard deviations. In contrast, eighth-grade math scores in
North Carolina grew 0.42 student-level standard deviations faster than the rest of
the country between 1992 and 2000. Thus, even under this extreme scenario, the
exclusions cannot explain all of the excess rise in test scores. Grissmer and Flanagan (forthcoming) reach a similar conclusion.
Third, there is no evidence that the rate of improvement in North Carolina
accelerated in 1997, when the state first began offering financial incentives to
teachers and schools.14 Between 1993 and 1999, fourth-grade and eighth-grade
math scores grew by 0.58 and 0.5 standard deviations, respectively (0.1 and 0.09
standard deviations per year), with similar improvements at the 90th and 10th
percentiles. However, the rate of increase between 1996 and 1999 —after the
financial incentives were added—was no higher than the rate of increase between
1993 and 1996.
More generally, performance on state high-stakes tests must be interpreted
cautiously. Unlike North Carolina, the improvements in most states on the test used
for accountability purposes are far larger than improvements on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress scores (Linn and Dunbar, 1990). For example,
Koretz and Barron (1998) found that improvements on the fourth-grade math test
Kentucky used for its accountability system were four times as large (in standard
deviation units) as that state’s improvement in the NAEP between 1992 and 1996.
Klein et al. (2000) also report that the increase in scores on the Texas Assessment
of Academic Skills was much larger than the improvement on the NAEP.
There are several reasons we might see larger improvements on a state’s
high-stakes tests than on other tests. For example, the tests may not measure the

13
Hanushek and Raymond (2002) report that the states establishing accountability systems were also
more likely to witness an increase in their special education populations.
14
A somewhat similar issue of the timing of school accountability programs and test results arises in the
Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) study of the impact of an accountability system in Dallas in 1991. Test scores
did rise more quickly in Dallas than in other Texas cities, but the timing of the increase predated the
accountability system by one year.
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same skills. The Kentucky test focused more on general problem-solving skills,
while the NAEP tends to focus more on specific mathematical knowledge. The
North Carolina test was probably more similar to the NAEP than the Kentucky
test—so it may not be surprising that the increases on NAEP and the state test were
similar.
But the differentials in improvement may also reflect perverse incentives that
are unavoidable with a high-stakes test. For any concept to be tested, the questions
must eventually take written form, and coaching on that form can often have an
impact on student performance. Koretz (forthcoming), who provides a particularly
illuminating discussion of these issues, cites an arresting example reported by
Shepard (1988), drawing on data from the New Jersey Department of Education
(1976). Students in New Jersey were asked to add and subtract decimals. When
students were asked to add decimals in the familiar vertical format, the passing rate
was 86 percent; when the decimals were provided in horizontal format, the passing
rate was 46 percent; when students were asked to subtract rather than add, the
passing rates in the vertical and horizontal formats were 78 and 30 percent,
respectively. When Koretz et al. (1996) asked teachers in Kentucky to report the
importance of several different factors to account for the improvements in student
test scores, more than half of the teachers said “increased familiarity” with Kentucky’s accountability test and “work with practice tests and preparation materials”
had been important, while only 16 percent reported that “broad improvements in
knowledge and skills” accounted for the improvement.
When the stakes are sufficiently high, accountability systems can even generate
cheating by teachers and school administrators. There have been a number of
anecdotal examples of educators falsely raising student achievement: investigators
in New York City charged that dozens of educators had cheated, telling students to
change incorrect answers or giving them practice tests containing questions from
the actual test (Goodnough, 1999). Michigan launched a widespread investigation
of teacher cheating on the 2001 state assessment (Wilgoren, 2001). However,
evidence on the actual extent of cheating has been understandably scarce. Jacob
and Levitt (2002) take a novel approach, identifying cheating by focusing on
schools with unusual patterns of common student responses combined with unexpected rises and subsequent declines in student performance. Their estimates
suggest that 4 –5 percent of classroom test scores in Chicago elementary schools
were affected by such cheating.
Thus, even if school accountability programs bring increases in test scores,
such increases should be interpreted conservatively until they can be connected to
other evidence of gains in learning.15

15

Kane and Staiger (2001) report that the elementary schools in North Carolina with the largest
improvements in mean gain scores did not improve on other measures of student engagement, such as
absenteeism, television viewing and time spent on homework.
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The Promise of School Accountability
The success of a school accountability system will depend upon the quality of
the performance measures available and the way in which rewards and sanctions
are structured. If performance measures are noisy or if they have the potential to
distort behavior in undesirable ways, then the literature on optimal incentives
suggests that the marginal payoff attached to such measures be downweighted
(Baker, 1992, 2000). That does not mean that test score measures are of no value.
It simply means that accountability systems must be carefully designed to reflect the
noise and distortion inherent in test score measures, just as the design of incentive
contracts in other organizations reflects the quality of the performance measures
available (Gibbons, 1998).
How should a test-based school accountability system be designed? Kane and
Staiger (2002a) argue that, under plausible assumptions, the optimal incentive
contract should have three features that are currently lacking from most accountability systems. First, it would sort schools into separate size classes to account for
the fact that smaller schools have more variable performance measures. Second, it
would use average school performance over many years to increase the reliability of
the performance estimate and reward those schools that have persistently high test
scores. Finally, to preserve schools’ incentives in the short term, the optimal
contract would reward schools for exceeding their expected performance, with
smaller schools receiving smaller incentive payments in line with their less reliable
test score measures.
Critics of school accountability worry that current systems already place too
great a weight on imperfect measures of academic achievement and, on net, may do
more harm than good. To evaluate these concerns, one must have a sense of the
potential value that we should place on an increase in student achievement. Some
calculations reveal that the monetary value of even a small improvement in academic achievement can have very large payoffs.
Two recent papers provide estimates of the impact of test performance on the
hourly wages of young workers. Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) estimate that a
one standard deviation difference in math performance is associated with an
8 percent hourly wage increase for men and a 12.6 percent increase in for
women.16 These estimates probably understate the value of test performance, since
the authors also control for years of schooling completed.17 Neal and Johnson
(1996), who do not condition on educational attainment, estimate that an improvement of one standard deviation in test performance is associated with a 18.7 and
25.6 percent increase in hourly wages for men and women, respectively.18 Using a
16

Using similar data, but conditioning on high school grades as well as educational attainment, Grogger
and Eide (1995) find that a standard deviation in math scores was associated with a 5 percentage point
wage increase for men and 7.5 percentage point increase for women in 1986.
17
The Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) estimates may also differ because they include only the math
test score measure and not the composite measure of reading and math skills.
18
The correlation between test scores and earnings is not simply reflecting the payoff to innate abilities,
since improvements in test scores are also associated with higher earning prospects. Jencks and Phillips
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discount rate of 3 percent, the present value at age 18 of an increase of one
standard deviation in test performance is worth roughly $110,000 per student using
the Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) estimates and $256,000 per student using the
higher estimates from Neal and Johnson (1996).19 Discounting these values back to
age 9 —that is, fourth grade—would reduce the estimates to $90,000 and $215,000
per student. One might argue that a 3 percent discount rate is a bit low, since
investment in human capital is not risk free. But even with a discount rate of
6 percent, these estimates are only reduced by about one-third.
Such estimates are quite large relative to the rewards offered to schools for
increasing student test performance. For example, California paid elementary
schools and their teachers an average award of $122 per student if their school
improved student performance by an average of at least 0.03 student-level standard
deviations.20 Based on the calculations in the preceding paragraph, the present
value of such an increase in test scores to students in elementary school is in the
range of $2700 to $6400 per student (0.03 times $90,000 or $215,000). In other
words, the labor market value of the test score increase would have been worth
roughly 20 to 50 times the value of the incentive provided in 2001 by California—
the state with the most aggressive incentive strategy.
This calculation suggests that even the most aggressive state is paying schools
much less than the marginal payoff—at least if we thought the test score improvements reflected true achievement that would be rewarded in the labor market. In
other words, critics’ concerns about inaccuracies in performance measures may
already be reflected in the relatively weak financial incentives offered in most states.
In fact, the strength of incentives for schools in California is remarkably similar to

(1999) find that a one standard deviation improvement in math scores between tenth and twelfth grades
was associated with a 26 percent increase in earnings 10 years after high school graduation.
19
We used the following calculation, incorporating continued future productivity growth as suggested
by Krueger (2002):
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where ␤ is the proportional rise in wages associated with a given test score increase; wi represents wages from
age 18 through 64 estimated using full-time, year-round workers in the 2001 CPS; ␥ represents the general
level of productivity growth, assumed to equal 0.01; and r is the discount rate, assumed to equal 0.03.
20
The School Site Employee Bonus program provided $591 per full-time equivalent teacher to both the
school and teacher, or $59 per student based on an average of 20 students per teacher. The Governor’s
Performance Award (GPA) program provided an additional $63 per student. The growth target for the
average elementary school was 9 points on the state’s Academic Performance Index (API). Because the
state did not publish a student-level standard deviation in the API scores, we had to infer it. A school’s
API score was a weighted average of the proportion of students in each quintile of the national
distribution on the reading, math, language and spelling sections of the Stanford 9 test. For elementary
schools, the average proportion of students across the four tests in each quintile (from lowest to highest)
was .257, .204, .166, .179 and .194, and the weights given to each quintile were 200, 500, 700, 875 and
1000. Under the assumption that students scored in same quintile on all four tests, we could calculate
the student-level variance as .257(200 ⫺ 6202 ⫹ .204(500 ⫺ 620)2 ⫹ .166(700 ⫺ 620)2 ⫹ .179(875 ⫺
620)2 ⫹ .194(1000 ⫺ 620)2 ⫽ 89034, implying a standard deviation of 298. This is nearly five times the
school-level variance, which is roughly consistent with expectations.
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what Hall and Liebman (1998) found for CEOs: $1 in compensation for every $40
increase in firm valuation.

Conclusion
Can school accountability systems, redesigned to reflect the noise and distortion inherent in test score measures, generate enough real improvement in academic achievement to justify their expense? One would have to say that the jury is
still out. But the lack of statistical power for discerning the very small increases in
achievement needed to justify these systems means that the jury may never come
back in! For example, California’s current annual spending of $114 per student on
financial incentives is worth about $1800 in present value by the time a student is
age 18. A true increase in test performance of only 0.01 to 0.02 standard deviations
is enough to justify this expense, but it may be very difficult to discern empirically.
Therefore, one’s interpretation of the empirical evidence will depend even more
than usual on the null hypothesis. If one starts from the presumption that incentives matter and that an increased emphasis on student achievement is likely to
encourage schools to improve on the margin, then the burden of proof on those
arguing that we are placing inordinate weight on school test scores is quite high.
While financial incentives may encourage individual schools to improve, they
may not be sufficient by themselves to generate the growth many reformers seek.
Firm-level evidence from other industries suggests that an important channel
through which market reforms affect productivity growth is by shifting production
to more productive firms and closing down less productive firms, rather than by
gradual productivity improvements in every firm (Pavcnik, 2002; Tybout, forthcoming). Thus far, school accountability systems have led to little reallocation of
students across schools. In practice, the impact of strategies to reallocate students
(such as school choice or school closure) is limited by the lack of reliable performance measures, and may also create unintended consequences. Nonetheless, we
expect that effective school accountability systems may require both financial
incentives and some mechanism for reallocating students between schools.

y This paper was written with support from Dartmouth College and the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation. Christine Randazoo and Rebecca Acosta provided valuable assistance
compiling information on state accountability systems. We thank Amitabh Chandra, Nina
Pavcnik and the editors of this journal for helpful comments.
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